题  目：Penalizing Popularity? Market Power and Incentive Alignment in Platform Design

报告人：ALEX WHITE  清华大学经济管理学院

主持人：叶  兵

时  间：2012年11月2日   星期五   15:00-17:00

地  点：浙大玉泉校区外经贸大楼418室

 
                             欢迎广大师生参加！
 

                                                               CRPE秘书处
                                                               2012-10-29 

内容概要: Centralized platforms, such as search engines, shopping malls or governmental agencies, often face the problem of allocating limited positions to a variety of competitors. In most previous work on "multi-sided platforms" that addresses this problem, there is an explicit or implicit assumption that the value that particular agents offer to the platform owner is, roughly speaking, positively correlated to the value that they offer to other agents. For example, past work on sponsored search auctions often assumes that advertisers that are willing to pay the most for a prominent ad position also create higher surplus for users than advertisers with lower willingness to pay. However, this assumption seems unlikely to hold in many circumstances, and, if it fails,inefficiency caused by misallocation of positions is likely to occur. This paper explores theoretically the cause and consequences of this efficiency, as well as possible ways to correct it.