题目：Optimal Sequential Auctions with the Arrival of New Bidders

报告人：徐晓书 上海交通大学

主持人：叶  兵

时  间：2012年11月28日   星期三   15:00-17:00

地  点：浙大玉泉校区外经贸大楼418室

 
                             欢迎广大师生参加！

内容概要：This paper characterizes the optimal sequential ascending English auctions with sequentially arriving, patient bidders, when the auctioneer lacks commitment power and resale is allowed. We identify the “bidder-beneficial” equilibrium when multiple equilibria are possible. When previous bidders are included as potential buyers in later auctions, we show that the optimal reserve prices decrease. Although resale is allowed, we identify sufficient conditions under which the auctioneer can ban resale implicitly on equilibrium path.

                                                                    CRPE秘书处
                                                                    2012-11-23