题  目：Criminalizing Employee Negligence

报告人：龚炯   对外经贸大学

主持人：叶  兵

时  间：2013年3月22日   星期五   15:00-17:00

地  点：浙大玉泉校区外经贸大楼418室

 
                          欢迎广大师生参加！
 

                                             CRPE秘书处
                                             2013-3-18

Abstract

Prosecutors in many countries bring criminal charges against a firm’s employees following accidents in which no intent to harm exists. Proponents of criminalizing employee negligence point to the deterrent effect in preventing catastrophic accidents. Opponents express concerns regarding the incentives of firms and individuals to share critical information about accidents in subsequent safety investigations. We build an intertemporal negligence-and-punishment model to investigate the impact of criminalizing employee negligence. We find that criminalization internalizes an employee’s incentive to prevent such negligent accidents, which was previously absent without the risk of criminal prosecution. By inducing the employee to exert more effort, the firm reduces the liability exposure of an accident and social welfare increases as a result of smaller expected accident losses.