题  目:  Managing Persuasion

报告人： Charles Angelucci      哈佛大学

主持人：叶  兵

时  间：2013年5月8日   星期三   15:00-17:00

地  点：浙大玉泉校区外经贸大楼408室

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摘要:  I consider a setting in which a decision-maker relies on the advice of two polarized agents whose sole objective is to influence the policy ultimately chosen. The agents are polarized---what benefits one agent hurts the other---and do not respond to monetary incentives. The decision-maker commits to a mechanism specifying which policy to implement depending on the information revealed by the agents. The policy-rule must be distorted to both incentize information acquisition and elicit unbiased recommendations. I show that the optimal rule involves compromising rarely but rather strongly. In addition, when the decision-maker is biased, agents behave strategically in opposite ways.  These strategic considerations may severely limit the scope for balanced information provision when the costs of information gathering are low. 

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                                                        2013-5-4