题  目：Generalized Coarse Matching

报告人：Ran Shao，Yeshiva University

主持人：叶  兵   浙江大学经济学院

时  间：2013年6月19日   星期三   14:00-16:00

地  点：浙大玉泉校区外经贸大楼418室
 

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Abstract: This paper analyzes the performance of coarse matching of two heterogeneous populations, e.g., men and women. If the payo¤ from a match exhibits complemen-tarities, it is well known that absent any friction positive assortative matching is optimal (PAM). Coarse matching refers to a situation in which the populations are partitioned into a .nite number of classes (sub-markets), then randomly matched within these classes. The implementation of PAM often subjects to strong infor- mation requirement, hence, high potential transaction cost. On the contrary, some coarse matching may perform relative well without demanding too much information. We establish e¢ ciency bounds for coarse matching with arbitrary classes and information structure. One of the major contributions is to show that one can separate e¤ects on e¢ ciency bounds due to distributions and sizes of sub-markets by representing the upper bounds in a form of a multiplication of a coe¢ cient of distributions alone and a function of sizes of sub-markets only. Depending on the properties of distributions and the choice .exibility of the information structure, more results are developed to improve/simplify the upper bounds. Moreover, this paper also establishes a connection between such matching model with complete (imperfect) information and the contracting models with incomplete information, i.e., mechanism design with limited information. We employ the matching results to evaluate the performance of coarse contracts. We show that these results are applicable to a broad class of applications, including a monopoly pricing problem, as well as to a cost-sharing problem with both incomplete information and moral hazard.

                                                   CRPE秘书处
                                                   2013-6-17