题  目：Unemployment Insurance Eligibility Rules, Moral Hazard, and Unemployment Insurance Contract

报告人：张  敏     上海财经大学

主持人：叶  兵   浙江大学经济学院

时  间：2013年10月11日   星期五   15:00-17:00

地  点：浙大玉泉校区外经贸大楼418室

               欢迎广大师生参加！

Abstract

This paper derives optimal unemployment insurance (UI) bene.ts and reemployment UI contribution fees when workers have to earn their UI eligibility through work and the UI bene.ts do not last forever. The consideration of UI eligibility rule generates entitlement effect, which alters the nature of the optimal UI contract established in the literature. In contrast with the previous studies, we find that when the entitlement e¤ect is large, it prefectly removes the moral hazard problems in job search, job acceptance, and job attainment. As a result, the UI transfers under the optimal contract become constant. Calibrated to the data in the United States, the model reproduces some key features of the actual UI system both qualitatively and quantitatively, and con.rms the theoretical analysis.