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NO. 196  报告人:陈朴

——Moral Hazard and Bargaining Power

编辑:系统管理员时间:2013-10-16访问次数:284

 

题  目:Moral Hazard and  Bargaining Power

报告人:陈  朴     中国人民大学

主持人:叶  兵   浙江大学经济学院

时  间:2013年10月18日   星期五   15:00-17:00

地  点:浙大玉泉校区外经贸大楼418室
 

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Abstract

We study an alternating-offer game in the moral hazard framework with limited liability where the principal is risk-neutral and the agent is risk-averse. The limited liabilities induce the non-monotone relationship between efforts and bargaining power. The delivered efforts are maximized when both parties hold some bargaining powers.

 

                                                    CRPE秘书处
                                                    2013-10-16