NO. 196 报告人:陈朴
——Moral Hazard and Bargaining Power
编辑:系统管理员时间:2013-10-16访问次数:284
题 目:Moral Hazard and Bargaining Power
报告人:陈 朴 中国人民大学
主持人:叶 兵 浙江大学经济学院
时 间:2013年10月18日 星期五 15:00-17:00
地 点:浙大玉泉校区外经贸大楼418室
欢迎广大师生参加!
Abstract
We study an alternating-offer game in the moral hazard framework with limited liability where the principal is risk-neutral and the agent is risk-averse. The limited liabilities induce the non-monotone relationship between efforts and bargaining power. The delivered efforts are maximized when both parties hold some bargaining powers.
CRPE秘书处
2013-10-16

