题  目： Comparing Open-loop and Feedback Nash Equilibria in the Lab

报告人：凌  晨      副教授     

        西南财经大学经济学院

主持人：夏�君   浙江大学经济学院

时  间：2014年4月11日   星期五   15:00-17:00

地  点：浙大玉泉校区外经贸大楼418室

                          欢迎广大师生参加！

Abstract:  It is well known that the open-loop solution and feedback solution are equivalent in optimal control theory. However, the open-loop Nash equilibria are, in general, different from the feedback Nash equilibria in dynamic game theory. Although numerous analytical and numerical examples exist for this difference in the literature, little behavioral or empirical examination has yet been undertaken. In this paper, I use experiments to study whether behavior under the open-loop information pattern differs from behavior under the feedback information pattern in a canonical dynamic duopoly game. In addition, I explore whether behavior can be captured with these two equilibrium solutions. The results of the experiment show that subjects’ average behaviors, in most cases, are indistinguishable between games with these two distinct information patterns and are inconsistent with the open-loop Nash equilibira and feedback Nash equilibria.

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                                                   2014-3-31