题  目：Product Design in Selection Markets

报告人：Andre Veiga  牛津大学博士后

主持人：叶兵   浙江大学经济学院

时  间：2014年4月16日   星期三   15:00-17:00

地  点：浙大玉泉校区外经贸大楼418室

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Abstract: Insurers choose plan characteristics to sort for profitable consumers. In a model with multidimensional types, this sorting incentive is proportional to the covariance, among marginal consumers, between marginal willingness-to-pay and cost to the insurer. Standard forms of cost-sharing successfully repel costly consumers, but reducing plan comprehensiveness instead alienates the risk-averse. In a perfectly competitive equilibrium, the sorting incentive must vanish. Market power increases insurance quality and welfare. Nonetheless, a competitive equilibrium with positive insurance is possible when insurance value is sufficiently negatively correlated with cost. However, in a calibration to Handel, Hendel and Whinston (2013)’s data, equilibrium still fails to exist.

                                                              CRPE秘书处
                                                              2014-4-11