题  目：Hybrid Mechanisms for Car Licenses Allocation with Budget Constraints

报告人：孙宁     教授   上海财经大学经济学院

主持人：夏�君   浙江大学经济学院

时  间：2014年4月21日   星期一   15:00-17:00

地  点：浙大玉泉校区外经贸大楼418室

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Abstract: In this paper, we use a multi-unit auction model to describe the car licenses allocation problem in China, where buyers are assumed to be of unit demand and hold budget constraints. When designing a car licenses allocation mechanism, the social planner is assumed to consider three factors: efficiency, revenue, and equality. We give a modified Gini coefficient to measure the equality of an allocation mechanism. We then propose a kind of Hybrid Mechanisms for car licenses allocation incorporating auction and lottery, and discuss bidders’ relative strategies. By numerically computing the expressions of efficiency, equality and revenue under the assumption of continuum-mass agents and licenses, we present the character of the hybrid mechanism with different parameters. Simulations under the assumption of discrete number of agents and licenses are also run to check the robustness of the results of continuum-mass cases. We further describe the Probabilistic Allocation Mechanism and Auctions with price ceilings and compare them with the Hybrid Mechanisms.

                                         CRPE秘书处
                                         2014-4-18