题  目：A dynamic Markov tournament model of an up-and-down competition for status

报告人：Scott Gilpatric     副教授   美国田纳西大学经济学系

主持人：夏�君   浙江大学经济学院

时  间：2014年4月25日   星期五   15:00-17:00

地  点：浙大玉泉校区外经贸大楼418室

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Scott Gilpatric，美国田纳西大学经济学系副教授，主要研究领域为产业组织理论、行为经济学、公共政策。论文发表在RAND Journal of Economics, Journal of Public Economics, Marketing Science, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Economic Inquiry, Southern Economic Journal等期刊。

Abstract: We develop a dynamic Markov model to capture the incentives in indefinitely-repeated tournaments in labor market settings where agents compete both to “move up” as well as to avoid a “move down”. Such settings naturally arise regardless of whether explicit performance incentives or an organizational hierarchy exist. We show that when monetary incentives are available the dynamic tournament approaches the first-best outcome, but we also allow for the possibility that the principal’s only available incentive mechanism is the assignment of undesirable tasks to agents who are out-of-favor. Inability to change salaries or demote workers is common for public organizations, such as government agencies and schools. For instance, a school principal may not be able to monetarily reward or sanction teachers based on performance, but typically has discretion within the labor contract to vary class assignments and resources such as teacher’s aides. We model agents as being either in or out of favor with the principal in any given period; those who are out of favor are assigned more undesirable tasks. The prize of the tournament is the difference between groups (in favor and out of favor) in the present value of the agent’s expected utility. We assume that agents’ effort cost of completing contractible tasks is such that these costs are minimized by assigning equally burdensome tasks to all agents. Therefore the principal can motivate non-contractible effort through differential task assignment, but this entails an efficiency cost. The model demonstrates that employers may seek flexibility to vary task assignments in labor contracts not only to adapt to changing circumstances, but also to enable them to motivate non-contractible effort when agents’ compensation in fixed.

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                                               2014-4-23