题  目：Targeted Advertising on Competing Platforms

报告人：Huanxing Yang    associate professor    Ohio State University

主持人：夏�君   浙江大学经济学院

时  间：2014年5月8日   星期四   15:00-17:00

地  点：浙大玉泉校区外经贸大楼418室

                           欢迎广大师生参加！

Abstract: This paper studies targeted advertising in two sided markets. Two platforms, with different targeting abilities, compete for single-homing consumers, while advertising .rms are multi-homing. We show that the platform with a higher targeting ability will attract more consumers and have more advertising .rms. When the targeting ability of either platform increases, all consumers bene.t as they will incur lower nuisance costs from advertising. Compared to the equilibrium outcome, monopoly ownership always leads to more skewed consumer allocation between two platforms. We also compare the advertising levels and consumer allocation under the social optimum and those under equilibrium. We .nd that in most cases, platforms underinvest in targeting abilities in equilibrium.

                                                      CRPE秘书处
                                                       2014-5-4