题  目：Does competition promote disclosure?

报告人：Wing Suen  教授           （香港大学经济金融学院）

主持人：夏�君   浙江大学经济学院

时  间：2014年5月23日   星期五   15:00-17:00

地  点：浙大玉泉校区外经贸大楼418室

                     欢迎广大师生参加！

Abstract: We study two classes of communication games with multiple senders.  It is fruitful to view the messages sent by competing senders as informative experiments available to the decision maker.  Because a sender may induce disagreement with the decision maker, we develop a general result that underlies our analysis: when two Bayesian individuals have mutually-known different priors over the state, each believes that a more Blackwell-informative experiment will, on expectation, bring the other's posterior closer to his own prior.
We show that senders' disclosure behavior are strategic complements when there is a cost to lying or to concealing information, but strategic substitutes when there is a cost to disclosing information.  Competition promotes disclosure in the former case, but when disclosure is costly, a receiver can be better off with fewer senders.

                                                 CRPE秘书处
                                                 2014-5-20