题  目：Approximate Efficiency and Generalized Public Punishment

报告人：陈庆池    教授     复旦大学经济学院

主持人：夏�君   浙江大学经济学院

时  间：2014年11月19日   星期三   15:00-17:00

地  点：浙大玉泉校区外经贸大楼418室

                          欢迎广大师生参加！

Abstract: We show that in repeated games with private monitoring and communication a necessary condition for the existence of a strict and approximately efficient perfect Bayesian equilibrium is that some efficient outcome of the stage game can be strictly enforced with transfers that always add to a negative sum and satisfy a "no generalized public punishment" condition. The condition, which requires that the expected total transfer conditional on any element of the meet of the players' information partions be constant, is also sufficient if the players can exchange side-payments at the end of each period. The result extends the results of Abreu, Milgrom, and Pearce (1991) to repeated games of any monitoring structure.

                                       CRPE秘书处
                                       2014-11-14