题  目：Contests for Experimentation

报告人：刘庆民  副教授  哥伦比亚大学

主持人：汪淼军   教授   浙大经济学院

时  间：2015年7月13日   星期一   15:30-17:00

地  点：浙大玉泉校区外经贸大楼418室

 
                           欢迎广大师生参加！

Abstract: We study the design of contests for innovation when there is learning: contestants' beliefs evolve about both the innovation's feasibility and opponents' outcomes. We characterize contests that maximize the probability of innovation when the designer chooses how to allocate a prize and what information to disclose over time about contestants' successes. A “public winner-takes-all contest" dominates public contests---those where any success is immediately disclosed---with any other prize-sharing scheme as well as winner-takes-all contests with any other disclosure policy. Yet, jointly modifying the prize-sharing scheme and the disclosure policy can increase innovation. A ”hidden equal-sharing contest'' is optimal under simple conditions.

刘庆民简历：2007年毕业于斯坦佛大学，2007年--2008年在耶鲁大学从事博士后研究，2008年--2011年在宾夕法尼亚大学经济系任教，现为哥伦比亚大学经济系终身职副教授。刘庆民主要从事把微观理论和博弈论理论方面的研究，在博弈论的认识论、声誉理论以及匹配理论颇有建树，已经在Econometrica 、Review of Economic Studies,以及Journal of Economic Theory发表多篇论文，是目前国际上博弈论理论方向的超级新星。

                                                             CRPE秘书处
                                                             2015-6-2