题  目：Involuntary Political Connections and Firm Outcomes

报告人：舒海兵   上海交通大学安泰经管学院助理教授，金融工程学博士

主持人：宋华盛  教授  浙江大学经济学院

时  间：2018年3月30日 （周五）   14:00―15:30

地  点：浙江大学玉泉校区经济学院418室  

Abstract

While prior studies focus on active corporate political connections such as board appointments, campaign contributions, and lobbying expenditures, this paper focuses on involuntary connections that are ubiquitous and not actively pursued by the firm. We estimate the causal effect of these connections on firm outcomes by exploiting the exogeneity of the geographic distance between Collective firms and local governments in China. Distance from government reduces the number of visits by local government officials and improves operating performance. Furthermore, firms’ growth, survival and entry rates are higher in more distant regions, whereas exit rates are lower. In contrast, firms’ distance from government does not affect the level of government subsidies or expenses. Consistent with our model’s predictions, the effect is weaker when the government is bigger, when the local legal system is more developed, when road infrastructure is better, and following adverse economic shocks. We analyze firms’ responses to a World Bank survey to investigate the economic mechanisms through which involuntary connections operate. We find that distance from government increases firm autonomy, and reduces taxes, protectionism, anti-competitive behavior, and time spent on interactions with government officials. Overall, we provide clean evidence on firms’ ties to governments that are ubiquitous and less known.

报告人简介：

舒海兵博士，金融学助理教授，金融工程博士，毕业于中国科学技术大学，弗吉尼亚大学达顿商学院联合培养博士、博士后。曾历任长江商学院research fellow，香港科技大学访问学者，上海最会保网络科技有限公司首席战略官、副总裁。舒海兵博士的学术研究主要集中在实证公司金融、公司治理领域，研究成果已发表在Journal of Financial Economics、Journal of Management Studies等学术期刊。

CRPE秘书处
2018-3-27