题 目：Social Networks with Two Types of Links

报告人：Xiannong ZHANG  Ph.D. candidate, Washington University in St. Louis

主持人：宋华盛   教授  浙江大学经济学院

时 间：2018年6月15日（周五）  14:00―15:30

地 点：浙江大学玉泉校区经济学院418室  

Abstract: I study a network formation game with two types of links: positive links and negative links. Positive links represent “friendship” or “ally”, it needs mutual consent to be formed and it is beneficial to both parties. Negative links represent hostile relationships such as “fight” or “bullying”, it can be formed unilaterally and the utility transfers from the receiver to the initiator. An interaction process is defined in the model, and agents are paired randomly. Agents can form links costlessly in the process but they need to exert effort to stay in the process. I characterize the equilibrium in which there are two types of agents and same type agents choose the same strategy. I show the condition for the existence of the interior solution and discuss policy implications. I am generally interested in the following questions: (1) What is the change in degree distribution after the interacting process (2) What can the planner do to reduce negative links (3) What can we infer about negative links from positive links. This model is closely related to school bullying and international relationships.

CRPE秘书处
2018-6-11