NO. 336 报告人:黄宗博
——The Risk of Implicit Guarantees-Evidence from Shadow Banks in China
编辑:系统管理员时间:2020-06-18访问次数:10929
题 目:The Risk of Implicit Guarantees - Evidence from Shadow Banks in China
报告人:黄宗博 助理教授 香港中文大学(深圳)
主持人:叶兵 副教授 浙江大学经济学院
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时间:2020年6月18日 周四 上午9:30-11:00
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摘要:
The shadow banking literature is anchored on the premise that shadow banking intensifies financial risks through its connection with regular banks. We document the importance of implicit guarantees as the risk transmission channel using a detailed micro-level data set on wealth management products, which are the most prominent shadow banking products in China. We find that when the risk perception of a bank increases, the bank extends stronger implicit guarantees to the investors of wealth management products to safeguard its reputation. Stronger guarantees incur more expenses, thus amplifying impacts of negative shocks to the related regular banks. The expenses account for a significant reduction in bank profits. Our results suggest a higher risk-weight for off-balance-sheet exposures for riskier banks.
个人简介:
黄宗博,美国普林斯顿大学经济学博士,现任香港中文大学(深圳)金融学助理教授。研究领域为公司金融和宏观金融,尤侧重于金融摩擦的对于实体经济的影响。
CRPE秘书处
2020-6-12

