题目：   Name as Incentive: Political Accountability without Re-election

报告人：王   博  助理教授    浙江工商大学国际商学院

主持人：叶   兵  副教授       浙江大学民营经济研究中心

时间：   2021年10月22日（星期五） 下午1：00 -2：30

地点：   腾讯会议（会议 ID：597 177 763； 本次会议对外开放，请加入会议者将个人姓名备注为 真实姓名+单位）

摘要:   We introduce a name market into an overlapping generations model to address politician selection and political accountability when office-holders need not stand for re-election. We show that the name market could mitigate both issues. On the one hand, acquiring a good name screens good politicians; on the other hand, earning a good name incentivizes old politicians. The political accountability problem is solvable because of the selection problem. Transparency of a politician's type crowds out the name, aggravating the political accountability problem. We finally derive the optimal information policy and discuss its economic implications.

简介：王博，浙江工商大学国际商学院助理教授；2019年博士毕业于香港科技大学，本科硕士均毕业于浙江大学经济学院。研究方向主要包括名字泡沫与全局博弈。有多篇文章发表于Economic Letters等学术期刊。

CRPE秘书处
2021-10-18